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American Religious Liberty in International Perspective 
 




This Article compares First Amendment religious liberty with prevailing 
international human rights norms on religious freedom, particularly as set out in 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1981 UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, the 1989 Vienna Concluding Documents. The United 
States Supreme Court’s cases on freedom of conscience, free exercise of 
religion, and religious equality and non-discrimination compare favorably to 
international standards, although the Court’s repeated failure to protect the 
distinct religious freedom claims of Native American groups falls short. The 
Supreme Court cases defending the principle of separation of church and state 
mesh well with international concerns for the rights and autonomy of religious 
groups, but go beyond international norms in largely removing religious freedom 
from public education. 
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Writing in 1787, American founder and future president John Adams 
offered a robust appraisal of the place of the new American constitution in the 
history of the world:  
 
The United States have exhibited, perhaps, the first 
example of governments erected on the simple 
principles of nature; and if men are now sufficiently 
enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, 
imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition, they will 
consider this event as a [new] era in history. Although 
the detail of the formation of the American 
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governments is at present little known or regarded 
either in Europe or in America, it may hereafter become 
an object of curiosity [for it is] destined to spread over 
the northern part of . . . the globe. The institutions now 
made in America will not wholly die out for thousands 
of years. It is of the last importance, then, that they 
should begin right. If they set out wrong, they will never 
be able to return, unless it be by accident to the right 
path.1 
 
More than two centuries later, Adams’s sentiments still prove remarkably 
prescient.  Particularly on issues of religious liberty, Adams and other eighteenth-
century American founders did, indeed, begin on the right constitutional path, and 
today most Americans enjoy ample freedom of religion as a consequence.  
American understandings of religious liberty have had a profound influence 
around the globe in the past century, and they now figure prominently in a 
number of national constitutions2 and international human rights instruments.3 
 
To be sure, as Adams predicated, there has always been “a glorious 
uncertainty in the law” of American religious liberty and a notable diversity of 
understandings of its details.4 This was as true in Adams’s day as in our own. In 
Adams’s day, there were competing models of religious liberty more overtly 
theological than his—whether Anglican, Reformed, or Evangelical in inspiration. 
There were also competing models more overtly philosophical than his—whether 
classical, republican, or libertarian in inclination.  But despite their deep 
differences, most eighteenth-century American founders settled on six main 
principles of religious liberty: (1) liberty of conscience; (2) freedom of exercise; 
(3) religious pluralism; (4) religious equality; (5) separation of church and state; 
and (6) no federal establishment of religion.  They designed the First Amendment 
religion clauses to balance these principles.  The First Amendment free exercise 
clause outlaws government proscriptions of religion—actions that unduly burden 
the conscience, restrict forms of religious exercise and expression, discriminate 
against religion, or invade the autonomy of churches and other religious bodies. 
The First Amendment establishment clause, in turn, outlaws government 
 
1 The Works of John Adams, ed. J. F. Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850–1856), 4:290, 292–293, 
298.  
2 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of our Country: The American Experience of Religious 
Freedom (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1998), 263-356.  For a good example of its influence on 
selected common law countries, see Symposium, “The Foundations and Frontiers of Religious 
Liberty: A 25th Anniversary Celebration of the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Tolerance,” 
Emory International Law Review 21 (2007): 1-276.   
3 See detailed analysis in John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver, eds., Religious Human 
Rights in Global Perspective, 2 vols. (1996); Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Bahia G. 
Tahzib-Lie, eds. Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Leiden/Boston, 2004); 
Natan Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights: 25 Years After the 1981 Declaration 
(Leiden/Boston, 2006);  
4 Adams, Works, 9:629–632, at 630. 
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prescriptions of religion—actions that unduly coerce the conscience, mandate 
forms of religious exercise and expression, discriminate in favor of religion, or 
improperly ally the government with churches or other religious bodies. Both the 
free exercise and establishment clauses thereby provide complementary 
protections to the first principles of religious liberty that the eighteenth-century 
American founders championed. 
 
Today, these founding models and principles of religious liberty have born 
ample progeny, and the great rivalries among them are fought out in federal and 
state courts, legislatures, and agencies throughout the land.  As several chapters 
in this volume have demonstrated, however, modern American constitutional 
laws on religious liberty are very much in transition today.5  Strong and settled 
free exercise and establishment laws of the 1960s to 1980s have now fractured 
into a series of shifting lines of federal cases on discrete topics, most with weaker 
standards of review and none providing an integrated framework for resolving 
religious liberty questions. This weakening and fracturing of the First Amendment 
has, in turn, triggered a small explosion of new federal and state legislation on 
religion, yielding an intricate mosaic of special religious preferences and 
exemptions. It has also triggered a brisk new industry of religious liberty litigation 
in state courts.  A neo-federalist understanding of religious liberty, with separate 
state and federal tracks of religious liberty law, is becoming a growing reality in 
America today -- to the delight of some and to the dismay of others. 
 
This chapter compares this modern American religious liberty law with 
prevailing international norms on point.  Comparative legal analysis is always 
edifying—if for no other reason than to have confirmation, from a fresh 
perspective, of the validity and utility of one’s own legal norms and practices and 
to gain an idea or two about reforming them.  But especially at this time of 
transition in First Amendment law, such comparative legal analysis is particularly 
salutary.  Moreover, a good deal of what appears in modern international human 
rights instruments captures the best of American constitutional learning on 
religious liberty.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the 
great 1966 Covenants encapsulate and elaborate American President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s famous “four freedoms”—including notably religious freedom.6  More 
recent international provisions on religious liberty were forged, in no small 
measure, by the efforts of American politicians, scholars, and activists. To 
compare First Amendment law with international norms is, in a real sense, to 
judge American law by a standard of religious liberty that it has helped to shape.7  
It is also to judge America by the same international standard which the U.S. 
Department of State and the U.S. Office and Commission of International 
 
5 See chapters __ above.  
6 See “Roosevelt’s Eighth Annual Message to Congress (January 6, 1941),” in State of the Union 
Messages of the Presidents, 1790–1966, ed. F. Israel (New York, 1966), 3:1. 
7 Louis Henkin, “Rights, American and Human,” Columbia Law Review 79 (1979): 405. 
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Religious Freedom now use each year to judge the laws and policies on religion 
of all other nations.8 
 
Several common international legal principles help to confirm, refine, and 
integrate prevailing American First Amendment principles and cases. The 
prioritizing of the principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise, and religious 
equality in international human rights instruments suggests a prototype for the 
integration of American free exercise and establishment values. The insistence of 
international human rights instruments that state abridgments of religious rights 
and liberties be both “necessary” and “proportionate” confirms the strict scrutiny 
test of American free exercise jurisprudence and its statutory analogues.  The 
heavy emphasis on the religious rights of groups in recent international 
instruments both confirms the American protection of corporate free exercise 
rights and one core understanding of the doctrine of separation of church and 
state.  The international doctrine of granting “a margin of appreciation”9 for local 
religious and political practices could be put to particularly effective use in our 
federalist system of government.  
 
What follows in this chapter is a brief review of the main teachings on 
religious liberty in the international human rights documents, and then a 
comparison of those teachings with prevailing First Amendment and related 
American laws on religious liberty.  
 
 
The International Framework of Religious Liberty10 
International religious rights and liberties have deep roots in classical 
Roman law, medieval canon law, and early modern Protestant and Catholic legal 
traditions.11 Their definitive modern formulation, however, came only after World 
War II, with the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948).  Four international instruments, elaborating the Declaration, contain the 
most critical protections of religious rights and liberties: (1) the International 
 
8 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 2787, 22 U.S.C.A. 6401. The act affirms 
the importance of religious freedom, as reflected in American history and law, and in various 
international human rights instruments. The act further decries the fresh rise of religious 
repression and persecution around the world and applies religious freedom standards in its 
assessment of diplomatic relations with foreign nations.  An Office of International Religious 
Freedom, with an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom publishes annual 
reports on the state of religious freedom on each of the 195 countries of the world, as well as in-
depth studies of selected countries.  The office also makes recommendations to Congress and 
the Executive branch on responses, including the imposition of economic sanctions, on countries 
that fall short of international standards.  
9 Clovis C. Morrisson Jr., “Margin of Appreciation in European Human Rights Law,” Revue des 
droits de l’homme 6 (1973): 263. 
10 This Section is adapted in part from John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional 
Experiment, 2d ed. (Boulder/London, 2005), 223-249 and John Witte, Jr., God’s Joust, God’s 
Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Grand Rapids, Mich., 2006), 63-142. 
11 John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern 
Calvinism (Cambridge/New York, 2008). 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (“the 1966 Covenant”);12 (2) the 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) (“the 1981 Declaration”);13 (3) 
the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of 
the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, which was promulgated in 1989 (“the 1989 Vienna Concluding 
Document”);14 and (4) the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of the Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (“the 1992 
Minorities Declaration”).15 
The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights largely 
repeats the capacious guarantee of religious rights and liberties first announced 
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions.16 
Article 18 distinguishes between the right to freedom of religion and the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion – the rough equivalent to what American law 
labels as liberty of conscience and free exercise of religion respectively. The right 
to freedom of religion—the freedom to have, to alter, or to adopt a religion of 
one’s choice—is an absolute right from which no derogation may be made and 
which may not be restricted or impaired in any manner. Freedom to manifest or 
exercise one’s religion—individually or collectively, publicly or privately—may be 
 
12 UN Doc. A/6316 (1968). 
13 U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1982). 
14 28 I.L.M. 527. 
15 Posted at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/minorities.htm. (last visited December 20, 2007). 
16 1966 Covenant, art. 18.1-18.4. 
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subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. The latter provision is an exhaustive list of the grounds 
allowed to limit the manifestation of religion.  The requirement of necessity 
implies that any such limitation on the manifestation of religion must be 
proportionate to its aim to protect any of the listed state interests. Such limitations 
must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in Article 
18 – an ideal that is often honored in the breach, even in many advanced 
Western countries.17 
Article 20.2 of the 1966 Covenant calls for States Parties to prohibit “any 
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence.”  Articles 2 and 26 require equal treatment of 
all persons before the law and prohibit discrimination based, among other 
grounds, on religion.  Article 27 further guarantees to religious and cultural 
minorities “the right to enjoy their own culture” and “to profess and practise their 
own religion.”   
The 1981 Declaration elaborates the religious liberty provisions that the 
1966 Covenant adumbrated.  Like the 1966 Covenant, the 1981 Declaration on 
its face applies to “everyone,” whether “individually or in community,” “in public or 
in private.”18  Articles 1 and 6 of the 1981 Declaration set forth a lengthy 
illustrative catalogue of rights to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” — 
repeating but also illustrating more concretely the 1966 Covenant’s guarantees of 
liberty of conscience and free exercise of religion.  Article 6 enumerates these 
rights as follows:  
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a 
religion or belief and to establish and maintain places 
for these purposes; 
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or 
humanitarian institutions;  
(c) To make, to acquire and use to an adequate extent 
the necessary articles and materials related to the rites 
or customs of a religion or belief;  
(d) To write, issue, and disseminate relevant 
publications in these areas;  
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for 
these purposes;  
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other 
contributions from individuals and institutions;  
 
17 Symposium, “The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion and 
Belief,” Emory International Law Review 19 (2005): 465-1320. 
18 1981 Declaration, supra note 2, art. 1.1. 
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(g) To train, to appoint, to elect, or to designate by 
succession appropriate leaders called for by the 
requirements and standards of any religion or belief;  
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holy days 
and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of 
one’s religion or belief; and  
(i) To establish and maintain communications with 
individuals and communities in matters of religion and 
belief at the national and international levels.19 
The 1981 Declaration also dwells specifically and at some length on the 
religious rights of children and their parents. It guarantees the rights of parents 
(or guardians) to organize life within their household and to educate their children 
“in accordance with their religion or beliefs.”20 Such parental responsibility within 
and beyond the household, however, must be discharged in accordance with the 
“best interests of the child.”21 At minimum, the parents’ religious upbringing or 
education of their child “must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or 
to his full development.”22  Moreover, the Declaration provides more generically, 
“the child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of 
religion or belief.  He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, 
friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom 
of religion or belief of others, and in full conscience that his energy and talents 
should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.”23 The Declaration leaves 
juxtaposed the parents’ right to rear and educate their children in accordance 
with their own religion and beliefs and the state’s power to protect the best 
interests of the child, including the lofty aspirations for the child’s upbringing.  
Despite ample debate on point, the Declaration drafters offered no specific 
principles to resolve the disputes that would inevitably arise between the rights of 
parents and the powers of the state operating in loco parentis.  Some further 
guidance on this subject is provided by the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child -- though the issue of parental rights over their child’s religious 
upbringing and welfare remains highly contested at international and domestic 
law.24  
As these children’s rights provisions illustrate, the 1981 Declaration, like 
the 1966 Covenant, allows the “manifestation of religion” to be subjected to 
“appropriate” state regulation and adjudication. The 1981 Declaration permits 
states to enforce against religious individuals and institutions general regulations 
designed to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. It is assumed, however, that in all such instances, 
 
19 Ibid., art. 6.  
20 Ibid., art. 5.1. 
21 Ibid., art. 5.2, 5.4. 
22 Ibid., art. 5.5. 
23 Ibid., art. 5.3. 
24 U.N. Doc. A/44/25; see further Symposium, “What’s Wrong with Rights for Children?” Emory 
International Law Review  (2006): 1-239. 
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the grounds for such regulations are enumerated and explicit and that such 
regulations abide by the international legal principles of necessity and 
proportionality.25   
The 1981 Declaration includes more elaborate prohibitions than the 1966 
Covenant on religious discrimination and intolerance.  It bars religious 
“discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person.”26  And it 
defines such discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on religion or belief, and having as its purpose or as its effect 
nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human 
rights or fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.”27  All such discrimination 
based on religion or belief, the Declaration insists, is “an affront to human dignity” 
and a “disavowal” of the “fundamental freedoms” that form the cornerstone of 
national and international peace and cooperation.28  Accordingly, the Declaration 
calls on all States Parties “to take effective measures to prevent and eliminate” 
such discrimination “in all fields of civil, economic, political, social, and cultural 
life,” including rescinding laws that foster discrimination and enacting laws that 
forbid it.29  
The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document extends the religious liberty 
norms of the 1981 Declaration, particularly for religious groups. Principle 16 
rounds out the list of enumerated rights guarantees quoted above from the 1981 
Declaration: 
16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to 
profess and practice religion or belief the participating 
States will, inter alia, 
A. take effective measures to prevent and eliminate 
discrimination against individuals or communities, on 
the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural life, and ensure the 
effective equality between believers and non-believers; 
B. foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect 
between believers of different communities as well as 
between believers and non-believers; 
C. grant upon their request to communities of 
believers, practicing or prepared to practice their faith 
within the constitutional framework of their states, 
recognition of the status provided for them in their 
respective countries; 
 
25 1981 Declaration, art. 1.3. 
26 Ibid., art. 2.1 
27 Ibid., art. 2.2. 
28 Ibid., art. 3. 
29 Ibid., art. 4.1-2. 
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D. respect the right of religious communities to 
establish and maintain freely accessible places of 
worship or assembly; organize themselves according 
to their own hierarchical and institutional structure; 
select, appoint and replace their personnel in 
accordance with their respective requirements and 
standards as well as with any freely accepted 
arrangement between them and their State; solicit and 
receive voluntary financial and other contributions; 
E. engage in consultations with religious faiths, 
institutions and organizations in order to achieve a 
better understanding of the requirements of religious 
freedom; 
F. respect the right of everyone to give and receive 
religious education in the language of his choice, 
individually or in association with others; 
G. in this context respect, inter alia, the liberty of 
parents to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions; 
H. allow the training of religious personnel in 
appropriate institutions; 
I. respect the right of individual believers and 
communities of believers to acquire, possess, and use 
sacred books, religious publications in the language of 
their choice and other articles and materials related to 
the practice of religion or belief; 
J. allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations 
to produce and import and disseminate religious 
publications and materials; 
K. favorably consider the interest of religious 
communities in participating in public dialogue, inter 
alia, through mass media. 
A number of these religious group rights provisions in the Vienna 
Concluding Document reflect the international right to self-determination of 
peoples. This right has long been recognized as a basic norm of international 
law, and is included, among other places, in the 1966 Covenant.30  The right to 
self-determination has its fullest expression in the 1992 Minorities Declaration.  
This right belongs to “peoples” within pluralistic societies. It guarantees a 
religious community the right to practice its religion, an ethnic community the 
right to promote its culture, and a linguistic community the right to speak its 
language without undue state interference or unnecessary legal restrictions.  The 
1992 Minorities Declaration recognizes that “the promotion and protection of the 
 
30 1966 Covenant, art. 1.1. 
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rights” of religious, cultural, and linguistic minorities is “an integral part of the 
development of a society as a whole and within a democratic framework based 
on the rule of law.”  Accordingly, it calls upon states to respect and to pass 
implementing legislation that protects and promotes the rights of cultural, 
religious, and linguistic minorities “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in 
public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.”31 It further 
provides that “States shall take measures to create favorable conditions to 
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to 
develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where 
specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international 
standards.”32 So conceived, the right to religious self-determination provides 
religious groups some of the same strong protections that are afforded to 
religious individuals under the freedom of conscience guarantee.   
These are the basic international provisions on religious rights on the 
books. Various regional instruments, notably the European Charter on Human 
Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981), elaborate some of these 
guarantees. Various religious declarations and treaties involving religious bodies, 
notably the recent concordats between the Vatican and Italy, Spain, and Israel as 
well as the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981) and the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990), give particular accent to the 
religious concerns and constructions of their cosigners.33  But the foregoing four 
instruments capture the common lore of current international human rights norms 
on religious rights and liberties. 
These instruments highlight a number of the hottest legal issues that have 
confronted national and international tribunals over the past half century: How to 
protect religious minorities within a majoritarian religious culture -- particularly 
controversial groups like Muslims, Mormons, Bahias, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Scientologists, Unification Church members, and indigenous or first peoples who 
often bring charges of religious and cultural discrimination.  How to place limits 
on religious and anti-religious exercises and expressions that cause offense or 
harm to others.  How to adjudicate challenges that a state’s proscriptions or 
prescriptions run directly counter to a party’s core claims of conscience or 
cardinal commandments of the faith.  How to balance private and public 
exercises of religion, including the liberty of conscience of one party to be left 
alone and the free exercise right of another to proselytize.  How to negotiate the 
complex needs and norms of religious groups without according them too much 
sovereignty over their members or too little relief from secular courts in the event 
 
31 1992 Minorities Declaration, Preamble and arts. 1-2.  See further Johan D. van der Vyver, 
Leuven Lectures on Religious Institutions, Religious Communities, and Rights (Leuven, 2004), 
67-90. 
32 1992 Minorities Declaration, art. 4.2.. 
33 See the collection of documents in Tad Stanke and J. Paul Martin, Religion and Human Rights: 
Basic Documents (New York, 1988).  
 11 
of fundamental rights violations by religious tribunals.  How to adjudicate intra- or 
interreligious disputes that come before secular courts for resolution.  How to 
determine the proper levels of state cooperation with and support of religious 
officials and institutions in the delivery of vital social services – child care, 
education, charity, medical services, disaster relief, among others.  
 
International Norms and American Laws Compared 
The United States has ratified the 1966 Covenant.  None of the fourteen 
reservations, understandings, or declarations that the United States put to the 
instrument seeks to avoid or evade the religious liberty standards set out in the 
document. The 1966 Covenant, however, is not self-executing.  It “does not, by 
itself, create private rights enforceable in U.S. courts.”34 It requires implementing 
legislation to become effective, and no such law to date has been issued.35 Yet, 
the 1966 Covenant holds out a high standard of religious liberty, which the United 
States has pledged to support. 
The 1981 Declaration, 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, and 1992 
Minorities Declaration are not binding legal instruments on the United States.  
Nonetheless, as collective expressions of common international opinion, if not 
common international law, on the meaning and measure of religious liberty, these 
instruments, too, carry ample moral, intellectual, and diplomatic suasion. 
These international human rights instruments both confirm and prioritize 
several of the founding principles of religious liberty in America – liberty of 
conscience, freedom of exercise, religious equality, religious pluralism, 
separation of church and state, and disestablishment of religion. The principles of 
liberty of conscience, individual and corporate free exercise of religion, and 
equality of a plurality of religions before the law form the backbone of the 
international norms on religious liberty. Liberty of conscience rights, with their 
inherent protections of religious voluntarism and prohibitions against religious 
coercion, are absolute rights from which no derogation can be made. The 
exercise of religion may be regulated only to protect either the fundamental rights 
of others or public health, safety, welfare, and morals, and the burden caused by 
the regulation must be “proportionate” to achieving that stated interest.  Equality 
of religions before the law must not only be protected but affirmatively fostered by 
the state, particularly to ensure the equal protection and treatment of religious 
and cultural minorities. A vast pluralism of forms and forums of religion and belief 
deserve protection—whether ancient or new, individual or communal, internal or 
external, private or public, permanent or transient.  
 
34 David P. Stewart, “United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The 
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations,” DePaul Law Review 42 
(1993): 1183, 1202ff. 
35 Louis Henkin, “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,” 
American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 341; Gerald Neumann, “The Global Dimension 
of RFRA,” Constitutional Commentary 14 (1997): 33. 
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International human rights instruments further confirm the American 
principles of corporate free exercise rights and the basic separation of the state 
from churches and other religious groups.  Religious groups organized for 
purposes of religious worship, education, charity, and other causes have the 
fundamental right to function in expression of their founding religious beliefs and 
values and must enjoy a level of autonomy of their own internal affairs. The state 
may regulate these religious groups only on stated grounds that are necessary 
and proportionate.  Conspicuously absent from international human rights 
instruments, however, are the more radical demands for separationism, rooted in 
the popular American metaphor of a “wall of separation between church and 
state.” Everson v. Board of Education (1948),36 McCollum v. Board of Education 
(1948),37 and other early establishment clause cases maintained that religious 
liberty requires the absolute separation of church and state and the cessation of 
state support for religion, particularly religious schools.  Only the secular state 
can guarantee religious liberty, it was argued, and only separation can guarantee 
the state’s neutrality on religious matters. Such views, which still pervade popular 
opinion in America, are not reflected in international human rights instruments 
nor, indeed, widely shared by other nation-states around the world.38  
If they were hypothetically applied in the United States, the international 
instruments would commend several lines of Supreme Court cases protecting 
liberty of conscience rights.  These include a series of cases from Arver v. United 
States (1918)39 to United States v. Welsh (1970),40 where the Court upheld 
federal statutes that granted conscientious objection status to religious pacifists.  
These also include several early free exercise cases from West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette (1943)41 to Torcaso v. Watkins (1961)42 that protected 
parties from coerced participation in swearing pledges and oaths as well as the 
later establishment cases of Lee v. Weisman (1992)43 and Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe (2000)44 that protected parties from coerced participation in 
public prayers and ceremonies.  And, these liberty of conscience cases include a 
series of sabbatarian cases, from Sherbert v. Verner (1963)45 onward, that 
 
36 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
37 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
38 See John Witte, Jr., “Facts and Fictions About the History of Separation of Church and State,” 
Journal of Church and State 48 (2006): 15-45. 
39 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
40 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
41 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
42 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
43 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
44 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
45 374 U.S. 398 (1963), extended in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 
U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).  
The Court, however, has not always been consistent in its treatment of sabbatarian concerns.  
See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (struck down state law that allowed 
private sector employees to pick their Sabbath, which employers must accommodate); Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (statute disallowing sales on Sunday does not violate free exercise 
rights of Jewish Saturday sabbatarian); and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 366 U.S. 
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relieved parties from having to choose between adherence to a core 
commandment of conscience and a set of government benefits to which they 
were otherwise entitled. The international instruments norms make it 
unequivocally clear that private parties have the right to chose, change, or reject 
religion without compulsion, control, or conditions imposed by the state.   
Particularly younger children, the 1981 Declaration and 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child underscore, cannot be compelled to 
participate in religious or secular activities to which their parents object.  Several 
American cases have confirmed this, based on the landmark case of Wisconsin 
v. Yoder (1972).46  To be sure, parental rights to control their child’s religious 
upbringing must be balanced against the state’s duty to protect the best interest 
of that child.  The international instruments would likely confirm the Supreme 
Court case of Prince v. Massachusetts (1944)47 that insisted that a minor child 
could not proselytize on the street corner at night in violation of child labor laws, 
even if the child’s guardian regarded that activity as essential to the child’s 
religious upbringing.  These instruments would also uphold Jehovah’s Witnesses 
v. King County Hospital (1968)48 that insisted that a minor child be given a 
necessary blood transfusion and other medical care, even though the parents 
wanted to treat the child by prayer alone as a test and testimony of faith.  
Endangering a child’s life and limb is an automatic trigger for state intervention – 
notwithstanding parental religious interests to the contrary.  
The international instruments would strongly commend the “strict scrutiny” 
test for free exercise claims. This was the test developed by the Supreme Court 
in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) and recaptured by 
Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (1993)49 and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)(2000).50 The test 
provides that when the state imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of 
a claimant’s religion, the state must show that it is pursuing a compelling or 
overriding purpose, has used the least restrictive alternative for achieving that 
purpose, and has engaged in no religious discrimination in drafting or applying 
the law in question.  Absent such showing, that state must either rescind the law 
or provide the burdened party with an exemption from full compliance. This 
American strict scrutiny test is the rough equivalent to the “necessity” and 
“proportionality” standard of the international human rights instruments, 
particularly as set forth in the 1966 Covenant.   
 
617 (1961) (Sunday closing law does not violate free exercise rights of owner of kosher super 
market, Orthodox Jewish customers, or rabbis with a duty to inspect kosher markets per Jewish 
dietary laws). 
46 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempted Amish from full compliance with compulsory school attendance 
law). 
47 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
48 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
49 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000b–4 
50 42 U.S.C.A.  secs. 2000cc-2000cc5. 
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Just as in international law, so in First Amendment law, this strict scrutiny 
regime of free exercise is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”51  Even in the 
Sherbert and Yoder heyday of 1963-1989, when the Supreme Court had strict 
scrutiny as its stated free exercise standard, government won nearly half the 
time, especially in cases where parties claimed free exercise exemption from 
taxation and social security laws.  These holdings are consistent with prevaling 
international and comparative law standards that all parties, including religious 
parties, must comply with a fairly administered tax scheme.52   
While they would applaud a strict scrutiny regime, the international 
instruments would find little to commend in the much narrower reading of the free 
exercise clause introduced by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy (1986),53 
Lyng v.Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988),54 and 
Employment Division v. Smith (1990).55 These latter cases, which now control 
application of the First Amendment free exercise clause by the federal courts, 
effectively reduce the free exercise guarantee to a type of heightened rational 
basis review.56  In particular, the Smith Court has held that laws that are judged 
to be “neutral and generally applicable” will pass constitutional muster regardless 
of the burden cast on religion or the nature of the power exercised by 
government.  Even a discretionary law or policy that crushes a central belief or 
practice of a free exercise claimant will survive constitutional challenge if it is 
neutrally drafted and generally applicable to all.  Only if the law is not neutrally 
drafted or generally applicable will government be required to demonstrate a 
compelling government interest that overrides the burdened free exercise right.  
Such a harsh, religion-blind neutrality leaves religious minorities too vulnerable to 
the machinations of state legislators and state judges who tend to keep their 
eyes on majoritarian sentiment and the next election.  This runs directly counter 
 
51 See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton, 
2006), 215 (quoting Gerald Gunther). 
52 See esp. U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denied free exercise exemption from social security 
taxes for Amish employer); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 
U.S. 378 (1990) (levy of state sales and use taxes on religious articles is not a violation of 
religious crusader’s free exercise rights). 
53 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (agency's use of social security number does not violate free exercise 
rights of native American, who believes such use would impair his child's spirit). 
54 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (construction of road through section of national forest regarded as sacred 
ground by three tribes does not violate free exercise clause; American Indian Religious Freedom 
Act provides no cause of action). 
55 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denial of unemployment compensation benefits to Native American who 
was discharged for sacramental use of peyote, a proscribed narcotic, does not violate free 
exercise clause). 
56 Save in cases involving blatant religious discrimination by the state.  See, e.g., Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (local ordinance transparently 
discriminating against Santerian ritual sacrifice of animals violates the free exercise clause).  But 
cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (state scholarship program established to assist 
payment of academically-gifted students' post-secondary education expenses for all students, 
except those pursuing a theology degree, does not violate the free exercise clause). 
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to the strong solicitude for religious minorities mandated especially by the 1966 
Covenant and the 1992 Minorities Declaration. 
It is especially troublesome that the Bowen, Lyng, and Smith cases 
involved claims by Native American Indians to special protection for their 
religious sites and rites. The right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, 
particularly their religious self-determination, is an important international human 
rights principle, and it requires unusual solicitude by nation-states.  Congress, in 
fact, had recognized this responsibility in passing the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act (1978), which called officials “to protect and preserve for American 
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the[ir] 
traditional religions ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and 
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials 
and traditional rites.”57 The Supreme Court’s cavalier treatment of the Native 
American’s religious liberty claims is a substantial blight on its First Amendment 
record.  The Court’s special accommodations of Adventist sabbatarianism in 
Sherbert and Amish communitarianism inYoder come much closer to the 
solicitude mandated by international human rights instruments. 
The international norms on equality and non-discrimination would applaud 
the free speech “equal access” and “equal treatment” cases from Widmar v. 
Vincent (1981)58 to Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)59 that give 
religious parties equal access to forums, facilities, and even funds made 
available to like-positioned non-religious parties.  They would likewise commend 
recent establishment clause cases like Agostini v. Felton (1997),60 Mitchell v. 
Helms (2000),61 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)62 that treated religious 
and non-religious schools alike in the distribution of general government-funded 
educational services and materials. Nothing in interntional law nor in First 
Amendment law requires the state to make public forums or state funds available 
to private parties.  But when the state does offer these forums or funds, it may 
not discriminate against otherwise eligible religious claimants in granting access 
or distributing them.63   
The international instruments would also commend cases like McDaniel v. 
Paty (1978)64 that removed special state prohibitions on religious ministers 
participating for political office.  It would also uphold the recent case of 
 
57 42 U.S.C. sec. 1996 (1978). 
58 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (when a state university creates a limited public forum open to voluntary 
student groups, religious groups must be given "equal access" to that forum).  
59 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (public middle school's exclusion of Christian children's club from meeting 
on school property after hours was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and was not 
required to avoid establishment of religion). 
60 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
61 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
62 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
63 Nor may the state may not discriminate in favor of religion for a non-essential accommodation. 
See, e.g. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (state sales tax exemption exclusively for 
religious periodicals violates establishment clause). 
64 435 U.S. 618 (1978) 
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Watchtower Bible and Tract and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton (2002)65 and 
several earlier free exercise and free speech cases that prohibited discriminatory 
licensing requirements against religious solicitors in public places. Non-
discriminatory and neutrally applied “time, place, and manner” regulations on all 
public speech, including religious and political speech and activities, is as 
permissible under the international instruments as it is under First Amendment 
law.66 But again singling out religious solicitors for special restrictions or 
requirements violates the essential religious liberty principle of equality and non-
discrimination. 
The principles of structural pluralism (or group rights) set out in the 
international instruments would endorse the many lines of cases and statutes 
protecting the forms and functions of religious associations, whether worship 
centers, religiosu schools and charities, or other such groups.67 Various Supreme 
Court cases upholding general regulation of these bodies in furtherance of 
health, safety, and welfare, and in exercise of regulatory, taxation and police 
power would likewise pass muster.68  The principle of structural pluralism, 
especially as elaborated in the Vienna Concluding Document, would look 
askance, however, at a case like Jones v. Wolf (1979),69 which permitted 
government resolution of intrachurch disputes involving “neutral principles” of 
law. The “deference test,” maintained by the Supreme Cout from Watson v. 
Jones (1871)70 to Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976).71 would find 
greater favor under international human rights instruments as a proper form of 
intrareligious dispute resolution. Also favorably received at international law 
would be the cases of NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1979)72 and Presiding 
Bishop v. Amos (1987)73 that protected the employment decisions of religious 
employers, including their right to engage in religious discrimination in their core 
employment decisions.  Neither international law nor American law would require 
a Catholic Church to hire a rabbi to say a mass, or require a synagogue to 
employ a Methodist minister to read the Torah on the Sabbath.   
The absence of a disestablishment of religion principle in international 
human rights instruments would not call into question the entire line of 
 
65 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
66 See the early summary free exercise case, Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) 
and the summary free speech case in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
67 See especially the classic early case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(invalidated state law mandating attendance at public schools as violation of rights of private 
schools and of parents). 
68  See, e.g, a good summary case in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 
471 U.S. 290 (1985) (Application of Fair Labor Standards Act Does not obstruct core religious 
functions of a foundation).  See generally William Bassett, Relgious Organizations and the Law, 2 
vols. (St. Paul, MN, 1997-2007). 
69 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
70 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
71 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
72 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
73 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  
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disestablishment clause cases that have emerged since 1947, principally on 
issues of religion and education.74  Many of these cases, serve to protect the 
principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise, religious equality, and religious 
pluralism in a manner consistent with prevailing international instruments.  But 
when there is a clash between such principles and the principle of non religious 
establishment, international norms would give preference to the former—as do 
American cases upholding the principle of accommodation. 
The international instruments do not have an equivalent to the Lemon test 
that the Court developed in 1971 to apply the First Amendment establishment 
clause. This test requires that a law or policy will pass constitutional muster 
under the establishment clause only if it (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a 
primary effect that neither inhibits or prohibits religion; and (3) fosters no 
excessive entanglement between religious and political officials.75  This test, 
while ignored or reformulated by several later Supreme Court cases, still finds 
favor among lower federal courts in the absence of a consisently applied 
alternative.  This Lemon test is consistent with international instruments in so far 
as it protects non-religious or religious minorities from coerced support for or 
participation in majoritarian religions, and protects various religious communities 
from undue intrusion or regulation by the state.  The Lemon test goes further 
than international instruments, however, in requiring a necessary “secular” 
purpose for a state law or policy.  The key to international religious liberty is not 
the secular nature of the law but the freedom of each individual to accept or 
reject the religions that are available. 
Moreover, the realm of education—where parental religious rights and 
preferences receive especially strong protection—is not the ideal place for undue 
zealotry in application of disestablishment values. To be sure, the international 
instruments would not countenance any more than the First Amendment coerced 
religious exercises in school classrooms—such as mandatory participation in 
prayers, pledges, confessions of faith, Bible reading, and the like—however 
strong the countervailing parental preferences.  But the constitutional purging of 
tax-supported public schools of virtually all religious symbols, texts, and 
traditions, in favor of purportedly neutral and secular tropes, stands in 
considerable tension with international principles of religious equality and of 
parental religious rights.  It also fails to recognize what the international 
instruments have long recognized—that peaceable religious, non-religious, and 
anti-religious “thought, conscience, and beliefs” are all “religious” and are all 
deserving of religious liberty protection.   
 
 
74 See a detailed summary of these cases in my Religion and the American Constitutional 
Experiment, ch. 8. 
75 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  This test was used most recently by the plurality 
opinion of Justice Souter in McCreary County v. ACLU, __ U.S. __ (2005), striking down a 
courthouse display of a Decalogue and other texts with prominent religious language.   
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Conclusions 
The ample vacillations in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment cases 
can be explained, in part, on factual grounds. The application of a sixteen-word 
guarantee to dozens of diverse and complex issues over the course of a century 
and more has inevitably led to conflicting decisions. “The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience,” Oliver Wendell Holmes reminds us.76 The 
American law of religious rights and liberties is no exception. 
These vacillations, however, also betray the failure of the Court to develop 
a coherent framework for interpreting and applying the First Amendment. The 
Court has tended to rely too heavily on its mechanical tests of free exercise and 
establishment and to use these tests as substitutes, rather than as guides to 
legal analysis. The Court has tended to pit the First Amendment establishment 
and free exercise clauses against each other, rather than treating them as twin 
guarantees of religious rights and liberties. The Court has been too eager to 
reduce the religion clauses to one or two principles, thereby often ignoring the 
range of interlocking first principles of the American experiment in religious 
liberty. The accumulation of these interpretive shortcomings, particularly in the 
past two decades, has brought the American experiment to a state of acute 
crisis—both of law and of faith in the law. 
The Court needs to develop a more integrated approach to First 
Amendment questions that incorporates the first principles of religious rights and 
liberties on which the American experiment was founded and integrates them 
into the resolution of specific cases. Such a framework is easy enough to draw 
up on the blackboard or in the pages of a treatise—and a number of important 
integrative methodologies and frameworks have been offered of late.  
Resort to international legal and human rights norms of religious liberty 
might seem a rather unpromising path to developing a more integrated American 
constitutional law of religious liberty. Not only have Americans been better at 
exporting their constitutional ideas and institutions than importing those of other 
peoples. But the budding international norms on religious liberty seem, by 
conventional wisdom, to have rather little that is worth importing. The canon of 
applicable international human rights norms has developed only slowly and 
sporadically since World War II. Very few international cases are at hand, and 
those that have been reported do not follow the conventional form and format of 
American constitutional law. International human rights norms would thus seem 
to be better left outside the ambit of First Amendment inquiry. 
To keep this parochial veil drawn shut, however, is to deprive the 
American experiment of religious liberty of a rich source of instruction and 
inspiration.  There are more golden rules of religious liberty in the mountains of 
international human rights documents than was traditionally thought.  A number 
 
76 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (Boston, 1881), 1. 
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of national and international tribunals, especially in Europe,77 are now mining 
these documents with new alacrity in discerning the meanings and measures of 
religious liberty for the twenty-first century. Both United States Congress and the 
United States Supreme Court have begun to consider international and 
comparative legal sources in defining and adjudicating other fundamental rights 
claims.78  It is time to cast American laws of religious liberty in international 




77 See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and 
Practice (New York/Cambridge, 2005); Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (New York/Oxford, 2001); Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and 
International Law in Europe (Cambridge/New York, 1997). 
78 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawerence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and 
analysis in Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, “Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational 
Law and the U.S. Constitution, Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1990.  
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